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Abstract—A novel framework to prevent manipulation be-
haviour in consensus reaching process under social network
group decision making is proposed, which is based on a the-
oretically sound optimal feedback model. The manipulation
behaviour classification is twofold: (1) ‘individual manipulation’
where each expert manipulates his/her own behaviour to achieve
higher importance degree (weight); and (2) ‘group manipulation’
where a group of experts force inconsistent experts to adopt
specific recommendation advices obtained via the use of fixed
feedback parameter. To counteract ‘individual manipulation’, a
behavioural weights assignment method modelling sequential
attitude ranging from ‘dictatorship’ to ‘democracy’ is developed,
and then a reasonable policy for group minimum adjustment cost
is established to assign appropriate weights to experts. To prevent
‘group manipulation’, an optimal feedback model with objective
function the individual adjustments cost and constraints related
to the threshold of group consensus is investigated. This approach
allows the inconsistent experts to balance group consensus and
adjustment cost, which enhances their willingness to adopt the
recommendation advices and consequently the group reaching
consensus on the decision making problem at hand. A numerical
example is presented to illustrate and verify the proposed optimal
feedback model.
Index Terms—Consensus, social network, group decision mak-
ing, feedback process, manipulation behaviour, adjustment cost.
I. INTRODUCTION
AGroup decision making (GDM) framework involves sev-eral experts who provide individual preference relations,
via the pairwise comparison of a finite set of alternatives X =
{x1, x2, ..., xn}, which are subsequently aggregated/fused into
a group preference relation from which a consensual ranking
of the alternatives is derived (consensual solution) [1]. Re-
cently, a large number of research articles on GDM from the
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decision makers’ psychology and behavior perspective have
been published, with prospect theory being one of the most
widely used theories [2], [3]. One challenge in GDM is how
to address inconsistency in group preference relations [4],
[5], i.e. it is desirable that the group of experts implement
a consistency based process to obtain the acceptable solution
by a suitable aggregation procedure [6]–[8]. In traditional
group decision making approaches, such as Delphi, consists
of a number of rounds of group interaction in which the
opinions provided by each expert are collected by the group
coordinator, who feedbacks the group experts on how to
modify their opinions to increase group consensus degree
in next round of group interaction, until an acceptable level
of group consensus (the threshold of group consensus) is
reached. In these traditional group decision making processes,
all experts are treated equally, and experts with consensus
levels below the threshold of group consensus (inconsistent
experts) are not paid special attention, nor they are specifically
informed/aware of the change of preferences cost they can
afford to reach the acceptable consensus. In order to overcome
these mentioned issues, consensus feedback mechanisms that
aim to effectively reduce or eliminate inconsistency have
been proposed by specifically implementing the generation of
recommendations, on how to change/modify opinions with the
associated cost of doing so, to support the inconsistent experts
on increasing their respective consensus degrees [9].
Generally, a feedback process contains two main parts:
(1) recommendation mechanism; and (2) implementation
mechanism. Usually, in the recommendation mechanism ad-
vices are generated after fusing the individual opinions to
derive a group one using an aggregation function. This is
done by associating weights to experts, possibly different to
represent different importances, which are implemented in the
specific aggregation process to be applied. One assumption of
traditional GDM models is that experts’ weights are provided
without taking into consideration any other information related
to the group of experts [10]–[14]. Other approaches are possi-
ble though, as the one proposed by Zhang et al. [15] in which
decision makers’ importance weights are determined using
different criteria based on the experts’ corresponding consis-
tency degrees. Recently, the concept of social networking has
been regarded as a useful resource to study/analyse the rela-
tionship and behaviour among group [14], [16]–[19]. Indeed,
trust relationship analysis approaches have been regarded as a
reliable method to assign experts’ weights in social network
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GDM (SN-GDM) due to the usage of the structure analysis
of existent connections between the considered experts [20]–
[23]. However, this is a ‘somehow’ static weights assignation
methodology because it is only based on the connection
quality without taking into account the behaviour of individual
experts or of the group itself [24]–[27]. In other words, the
relationship between weight and manipulation behavior is not
possible to be explored by the existing approaches, which
obviously impedes as well quantifying how the cost involved
in adjusting/changing opinions to achieve consensus is affected
by this type of behaviour. Therefore, a research is necessary
to study the behaviour among a group of experts in consensus
reaching process and its relationship with the adjustment cost
involved in reaching consensus.
The first issue addressed in this article refers to the study
of the manipulation behavior of individual experts in the
recommendation mechanism of a feedback model, which is
referred to as ‘individual manipulation’. Self-esteem of indi-
vidual experts [28], [29] may push them to change behavior
with the aim of achieving a greater benefit, which may be
linked to achieve greater importance degree (weight) in group
decision making, meaning more respect from peers in the
group. On one hand, in a conservative group decision making
environment a particular expert may be assigned with an
importance degree that amounts to a significant proportion
of the total sum of importance degrees for the whole group,
which can be regarded as ‘dictatorship’ when the full impor-
tance degree is given to one decision maker. On the other
hand, in an open environment each expert in the group may
be considered equally important, which means ‘democracy’.
Obviously, ‘dictatorship’ and ‘democracy’ states will have
associated different adjustment costs to reach the threshold of
group consensus. In any case, ‘dictatorship’ and ‘democracy’
are the two extreme cases of group behaviour, i.e. there exists
intermediate states of behaviour in group consensus reaching
process [30]. Thus, the first aim of this article will be the
development of a behavioural weights assignment method to
describe the different intermediate states of behaviour between
‘dictatorship’ and ‘democracy’ in group consensus reaching
process. The proposed complete group behaviour weights
assignment method will be described in terms of different
attitude parameters. The prevention of individual manipulation
behaviour in consensus reaching process is advocated in this
article with the reasonable policy of selecting the attitude
parameter with minimum adjustment cost for the group to
reach consensus (group aim).
The second issue this article deals is the study of the
manipulation behavior in the adoption mechanism of the
feedback model, which is referred to as ‘group manipulation’.
In the traditional feedback process [31]–[33], for consensus
to be reached quickly the inconsistent expert(s) is(are) forced
by the group to adopt recommendation advices, which are de-
rived using a fixed feedback parameter, without contemplating
whether the inconsistent expert(s) will like them, i.e. without
presenting their corresponding adjustment cost associated to
the implementation of the recommendation advices. In other
words, the inconsistent expert(s) may incur in an unaffordable,
and possibly unnecessary, cost in order to reach the threshold
of group consensus. However, group consensus (group aim)
is not the only driver of the inconsistent expert(s). Maintain-
ing their independence (individual aim), i.e. modifying their
original opinion as little as possible, is also a main aspiration
of individual experts [34]–[37]. Therefore, the dictation of the
feedback parameter by the group and its subsequent adverse
affect on the adjustment cost faced by individual inconsistent
experts, in order to reach the threshold of group consensus,
are drawbacks associated with traditional feedback processes
that require being addressed. To hinder group manipulation
behaviour in consensus reaching process, this articles develops
an optimal feedback model with the aim that inconsistent
experts exactly reach the group consensus boundary with
minimum opinions adjusting cost.
Thus, the proposed methodology to reach group consensus
will allow the inconsistent expert(s) to find their equilibrium
point between their individual aim (minimum cost) and group
aim (reaching consensus) by preventing both individual and
group manipulations by considering their behaviour in the
consensus reaching process.
The rest of this article is organised as follows: Section
II proposes a novel approach to ‘individual manipulation’
analysis in the weights assignment mechanism under a social
network environment with distributed linguistic trust function
(DLTF) information. A reasonable policy is established to
assign experts’ weights by considering the adjustment cost
variable. Section III focuses on the study of ‘group manipula-
tion’ in the feedback process, and develops an optimization
feedback model to determine the feedback parameter for
reaching consensus boundary. In Section V, the framework
of a consensus reaching process that prevents manipulation
behaviour is proposed, which is illustrated and validated with
a numerical example in Section VI. A comparison analysis
between the consensus model proposed herein and traditional
ones in Section VII. Lastly, Section VIII concludes the paper.
II. SOCIAL NETWORK FRAMEWORK WITH DISTRIBUTED
LINGUISTIC TRUST FUNCTIONS
Social network analysis (SNA) is regarded a powerful
method to investigate human social trust relation [38]. There
are three key elements in SNA (set of nodes, nodes relation,
nodes attributes) and three possible representation schemes
(sociometric, graphic, algebraic), which are shown in Table
I.
The sociomatrix shown in Table I is a binary relation or
crisp relation for the existence and/or lack of ‘trust’ scenar-
ios. However, realistic SN trust relationship representation is
more complex, with humans trust in their relationship being
described, more often than not, with words such as ‘high’,
‘middle’ or ‘low’, which underlines the uncertain nature of the
concept of trust [39]. In this context, Wu et. al [40] proposed
the following definition of distributed linguistic trust function
(DLTF):
Definition 1. Suppose that Ω = {Ωi|i = 1, ..., pi} is a linguis-
tic term set. A distributed linguistic trust function (DLTF) on
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Sociometric Graph Algebraic
A =

0 1 1 1 1 0
0 0 0 0 1 0
0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 1 1
0 0 1 0 0 1
0 0 1 0 0 0

e
1
e
2
e3
e
4
e
5
e
6
e1Re2 e4Re3
e1Re3 e4Re5
e1Re4 e4Re6
e1Re5 e5Re3
e2Re5 e5Re6
e3Re2 e6Re3
TABLE I: Different representation schemes in SNA
Ω is expressed as follows:
Θ =
{
(Ωα, ϕα)
∣∣∣∣∣(ϕα > 0 ∀α) ∧
pi∑
α=1
ϕα = 1
}
The set {α1, . . . , αpi} is the distribution assessment of Ω.
To rank DLTFs, Wu et. al [40] defined the following ordinal
based expectation and uncertainty degrees of a DLTF Θ:
• Expectation degree: E (Θ) =
pi∑
α=1
αϕα;
• Uncertainty degree: U (Θ) = 1pi
pi∑
α=1
(αϕα − E (Θ));
Given any two DLTFs, Θ1 and Θ2:
Θ1 ≺ Θ2
m[
E
(
Θ1
)
< E
(
Θ2
)] ∨ [E (Θ1) = E (Θ2) ∧ U (Θ1) > U (Θ2)] (1)
In the following, some definitions of the OWA operator
based aggregation of DLTFs in group decision making and
the distance between DLTFs are provided as needed later in
the paper to define agreement between a group of experts and
its individual expert members.
Definition 2 (Distributed trust OWA (DTOWA) operator).
The distributed trust OWA (DTOWA) operator with weighting
vector ω = (ω1, ..., ωn), subject to the conditions ωj > 0 and
n∑
j=1
ωj = 1, applied to a set of DLTFs
{
Θ1, ...,Θn
}
is
DTOWAω
(
Θ1, ...,Θn
)
= {(Ωα, ϕα|α = 1, ..., pi)} (2)
where ϕα =
n∑
j=1
wjϕ
σ(j)
α and σ is the permutation {1, . . . , n}
verifying Θσ(i) ≥ Θσ(i+1) ∀i.
Definition 3 (Distance between DLTFs). The distance between
DLTFs Θ1 and Θ2 is
d
(
Θ1,Θ2
)
=
∣∣Θ1 −Θ2∣∣ = 1
pi
pi∑
α=1
∣∣ϕ1α − ϕ2α∣∣ (3)
III. INDIVIDUAL MANIPULATION ANALYSIS IN GROUP
DECISION MAKING WEIGHTS ASSIGNMENT
Trust relationship in social network has been used as a
reliable resource to compute experts’ importance and as a
derivative their weights in aggregation individual preferences
into collective one. However, in general, trust relationship
measurement based static approaches are used to compute
experts’ weights. In reality, apart from trust, group behaviour
may affect the weights assignment mechanism, i.e. experts
may be willing to manipulate for their own benefit. Ma-
nipulation behaviour has been reported in multiple attribute
decision making in [41]–[43]. However, as far as we know, the
manipulation behaviour in GDM has not be reported so far.
Therefore, this section includes the proposal of a manipulation
model for assigning experts’ weights by aggregating trust
relationship in social network, from which to obtain trust
in-degree centrality values, with Yager’s linguistic quantifier
based OWA operator [44]. To do that, we first introduce some
DLTF based definition related to social network.
Definition 4. Let E = {e1, ..., ek} be a set of experts in a
social network. A DLT sociomatrix (DLTS) SL on E is a
network relation on E × E that associates a duple (em, en)
with a DLTF, Θmn = {(Ωα, ϕα) |α = 1, ..., pi}, representing
the trust degree from expert em to expert en, i.e.
µSL(em, en) = Θmn. (4)
In SNA, the importance level of nodes in a directed graph
is determined by the in-degree of centrality. In our research
framework this is translated in the following trust in-degree
centrality index, which measures the average expert’s trust
relationship from their peers in the social network. In general,
the higher the trust in-degree centrality of an expert, the higher
the importance associated to her/him.
Definition 5 (Trust In-degree Centrality). Let G = (E,L, ω)
be a directed graph, E = {e1, ..., ek} be the set of nodes and
L = {l1, ..., lq} be the set of directed edges between pairs of
nodes with associated DLTFs as per a DLTS SL = (Θmn)k×k.
The trust in-degree centrality (TDC) index of nodes is com-
puted as follows:
TDC (en) =
1
k
k∑
m=1
Θmn (5)
In order to model the manipulation behaviour in the process
of GDM, Yager’s OWA operator [44] is used to assign weights.
In decision making process, the majority concept can be ap-
propriately modelled via the linguistic quantifier concept [45],
[46], which is modelled as a regular increasing monotonic
(RIM) function Q : [0, 1] → [0, 1] with boundary conditions
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Q (0) = 0 and Q (1) = 1. In general, the weights of a
linguistic guided OWA operator (φQ) are obtained as follows:
ωh = Q
(
h
k
)
−Q
(
h− 1
k
)
, h = 1, 2, ..., k (6)
Interestingly, Yager [44] modelled the majority concept with
the RIM quantifier
Q (r) = rη (η > 0) (7)
The following two properties of this type of RIM quantifier
were proved in [47]:
• For η ∈ [0, 1], Q is concave. When ranking experts by
importance, the concavity of Q means that the weight
increases with the rank of the experts at the time. Indeed,
denoting h = 1, then it is the position given to the
most important experts; h = 2 means the position to the
second most important experts, etc.; denoting rh = hk , it
is obvious that rh =
rh−1+rh+1
2 and the concavity of Q
implies that
∀h : Q (rh) = Q
(
rh−1+rh+1
2
)
> Q(rh−1)+Q(rh+1)2
m
ωh > ωh+1
(8)
• For η 6= 0, Q is strictly monotonic, which means that all
weight values are positive and all users will contribute
to the final aggregated value. Indeed, for any r 6= 0 and
η 6= 0, it is dQdr (r) = ηrη−1 > 0. Hence:
η 6= 0⇒ ωh > 0 ∀h (9)
Additionally, the following result shows the monotonicity
relationship between the weights and the RIM quantifier Q
as functions of the parameter η.
Proposition 1 (Strict monotonicity property). Let Q (r) =
rη , η ∈ [0, 1]; then ω1 is strictly decreasing while
ωh (h = 2, ..., k) are strictly increasing with respect to the
parameter η.
Proof. From expression (6), we have:
• ω1 = r
η
1 . In general exponential function a
x is strictly
decreasing with respect to x when a ∈ (0, 1). Hence, ω1
is strictly decreasing with respect to the parameter η.
• h > 1 : ωh = r
η
h−rηh−1. The derivative of ωh with respect
to η is dωhdη (η) = r
η
h ln rh−rηh−1 ln rh−1. Both xa (a > 0)
and lnx (x > 0) are strictly increasing functions, hence
rh > rh−1 implies r
η
h > r
η
h−1 and ln rh > ln rh−1.
Therefore, it is rηh ln rh > r
η
h−1 ln rh−1 and
dωh
dη (η) > 0
∀η, which proves that ωh (h > 1) is strictly increasing
with respect to the parameter η.
The result of Proposition 1 regarding the depen-
dence of the importance degrees of experts on the at-
titude parameter η is visualized in Fig 1 for values of
η ∈ {0.125, 0.25, 0.375, 0.5, 0.625, 0.75, 0.875}. The extreme
0.125 0.25 0.375 0.5 0.625 0.75 0.875
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
η
w
e
ig
ht
e1
e2
e3
e4
Fig. 1: Effect of ‘individual manipulation’ for weights assign-
ment in GDM
cases of η = 0 and η = 1 are discussed below in relation to
the orness of the RIM quantifier (7):
orness(Q) =
∫ 1
0
rηdr =
1
η + 1
. (10)
The parameter η can be regarded as an attitude parameter.
Indeed, if the value η = 0 is used in (7), then ω = {1, 0, . . . , 0}
and all the importance will be allocated/assigned to the expert
with highest TDC value, i.e. (orness(Q) = 1, the OWA
guided by Q becomes the t-conorm maximum operator. This
case represents an authoritarian decision making model. If
η = 1, then ω = {1/k, ..., 1/k} and, irrespective of their
TDC values, each expert will be allocated the same importance
value, i.e. orness(Q) = 1/2, the OWA guided by Q becomes
the average operator. This case represents an egalitarian
decision making model.
The aggregation of experts’ DLT decision matrices using
the RIM quantifier guided OWA operator is as follows:
Definition 6. Let
{
Θh =
(
thij
)
r×s ;h = 1, 2, ..., k
}
be a col-
lection of DLT decision matrices given by a set of experts
E = {e1, ..., ek}, nodes of a directed graph G = (E,L, ω),
representing their assessments on a set of r alternatives with
respect to a set of s criteria. Their collective decision matrix
aggregated by trust relationship is Θ = (tij)r×s with element
tij =
k∑
h=1
ωh · tσ(h)ij =
k∑
h=1
((
h
k
)η
−
(
h− 1
k
)η)
· tσ(h)ij
(11)
where η ∈ [0, 1]; and σ is the permutation of {1, ..., n} such
that TDC
(
eσ(h)
)
> TDC
(
eσ(h+1)
)
(∀h).
In realistic cases, individual experts may aim to achieve
more respect from the group of piers via its own self esteem
value. Therefore, individual experts may be tempted to manip-
ulate the value of η with the aim to achieve a higher weight
(importance degree). For example, the highest trusted expert e3
in Fig 1 may select η = 0 to obtain the highest possible weight
of ω3 = 1 to become the person who decides for the group
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(dictatorship). On the other hand, expert e1, who is trusted
lowest by the group peers, may choose the value η = 1 to
get his/her maximum potential weights of 1/4, which would
lead to an egalitarian or democratic decision model where
everyone contributes equally, although it could be the result
of a strategic manipulation choice. Anyhow, there is a need to
investigate a reasonable method to determine the appropriate
value of η to benefit of group, and as a consequence, it is able
to prevent individual expert’s manipulation. The above study
and analysis shows as well that the attitude parameter η will
determine the network structure of the group of experts, and in
consequence, it will affect the adjustment cost of reaching the
threshold of group consensus, which is later illustrated in Table
II. Therefore, it is also worth investigating the relationship
between the attitude parameter η and the adjustment cost.
IV. DLTFS CONSENSUS BASED INDEXES AND VISUAL
IDENTIFICATION OF INCONSISTENT ELEMENTS
DLTFs based indexes are defined for consensus degree.
Then, a process is provided for the identification of incon-
sistent experts by three consecutive steps and their alterna-
tives and elements with consensus degree below the required
threshold of group consensus.
A. Consensus degrees
The distance between DLTFs is used to measure how
similar an expert’s opinions are to the group experts’ collective
opinion. The agreement or consensus of an expert can be
measured at three hierarchical levels:
Definition 7 (Consensus degree on the elements). “The
consensus degree between expert eh and the group on the
alternative xi under criterion cj element, (xi, cj), is”
CEhij = 1− d
(
thij , tij
)
= 1− ∣∣thij − tij∣∣
= 1− 1
pi
pi∑
α=1
∣∣∣(ϕα)hij − (ϕα)ij∣∣∣ (12)
Definition 8 (Consensus degree on the alternative level). “The
consensus degree between expert eh and the group on the
alternative xi is”
CEhi =
1
s
s∑
j=1
CEhij (13)
Definition 9 (Consensus Degree on the DLT decision matrix).
“The consensus degree between expert eh and the group on
the decision matrix is”
CEh =
1
r
r∑
i=1
CEhI =
1
rs
r∑
i=1
s∑
j=1
CEhij (14)
Definition 3 implies CEhij , CE
h
i , CE
h ∈ [0, 1]. Con-
sensus, as it is well known, is defined as the full and
unanimous agreement of all the experts regarding all the
feasible alternatives. However, it is inconvenient because it
only allows differentiating between two states: the existence
and absence of consensus. Also, the chances for reaching such
a full agreement are rather low. Therefore, a threshold value
of group consensus (γ) might be agreed before hand. The
following restriction can therefore be imposed to the group
consensus threshold: γ < 1. Additionally, the decision-making
output may be acceptable only when there is agreement
among at least half of the experts (simple majority). Thus, the
following additional restriction is imposed to the consensus
threshold: γ > 0.5. Obviously, the stronger the acceptance of
decision-making output, the higher the percentage of experts
in agreement. In passing legislation, legislative bodies may
require unanimous majority or qualified majorities such as
2/3 or 3/5 of votes [48]. For example, qualified majority is
the most widely used voting method in the European Council,
with a special ‘reinforced qualified majority’ in some cases
requiring as one of its two conditions that at least 72% of
Council members vote in favor [49]. In any case, a threshold
value higher than 0.5 is to be considered in practice to achieve
a qualified majority and it assures that the group of experts
are satisfied by the solution to implement. In this paper, we
will assume a threshold value of group consensus is 0.8.
B. Inconsistent elements identification
The set of elements (alternative, decision matrix) with
consensus degree below the group consensus threshold value
(γ) are identified with the following three consecutive steps
process, which is later visualised (see Fig. 3) and presented to
experts in the group during the feedback process.
Definition 10. Inconsistent elements identification process:
Step 1. Experts with low consensus index:
EXPCH =
{
h|CEh < γ} .
Step 2. Alternatives with low consensus index:
ALT =
{
(h, i) |h ∈ EXPCH ∧ CEhi < γ
}
.
Step 3. Elements with low consensus index:
APS =
{
(h, i, j) | (h, i) ∈ ALT ∧ CEhij < γ
}
.
V. GROUP MANIPULATION IN THE FEEDBACK MECHANISM
Aa aforementioned, the essence of ‘group manipulation’ is
that the group of experts forces the inconsistent expert(s) to
adopt the recommendation advices to reach consensus quickly.
This implies that the inconsistent expert(s) will face higher
adjustment cost than necessary while, at the same time, have
their independence lessened. To prevent group manipulation,
in conjunction with the visual representation of inconsistent
elements, this article develops an optimal feedback model to
balance group consensus (group aim) and individual indepen-
dence (individual aim).
A. Behaviour based feedback mechanism
The feedback mechanism recommends inconsistent experts
to change the assessments of their previously identified APS
elements to improve their consensus degree as per the below
rule:
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“Change your element (i, j) assessment thij to rt
h
ij .”
rthij = (1− δh) · thij + δh · tij ; ∀(h, i, j) ∈ APS (15)
The above recommended advice is highly related to the
original assessment, the group assessment and the feedback
parameter δh ∈ [0, 1]. In the traditional feedback model, the
feedback parameter δh may be set as high as necessary by
the group to speed up the consensus reaching process, which
can be considered as a manipulation in favour of the group
(group manipulation) and against the inconsistent expert who,
as argued above, will have their their independence lessened in
addition to a higher adjustment cost than necessary. A detailed
analysis of these two issues is provided in the following
subsections.
B. Consensus analysis of group manipulation
The relationship between the consensus index CE
g
and
the feedback parameter δg , when the inconsistent expert eg
adopts the feedback recommended value for element (xi, cj),
is derived below.
Firstly, the new collective assessment value for element
(xi, cj) will be:
rtij = ωg · rthij +
k∑
h=1,h6=g
ωh · thij = ωg · rtgij − ωg · tgij + tij .
Secondly, the new consensus index CE
g
will become:
CE
g
=
1
rs
r∑
i=1
s∑
j=1
(
1− ∣∣rtgij − rtij∣∣)
= 1− 1
rs
r∑
i=1
s∑
j=1
∣∣rtgij − rtij∣∣
= 1− 1
rs
r∑
i=1
s∑
j=1
∣∣rtgij − (tij + ωg · rtgij − ωg · tgij)∣∣
= 1− 1
rs
r∑
i=1
s∑
j=1
∣∣(1− δg (1− ωg)) · (tgij − tij)∣∣
= 1− (1− δg (1− ωg)) 1
rs
r∑
i=1
s∑
j=1
∣∣tgij − tij∣∣
= δg (1− ωg) 1
rs
r∑
i=1
s∑
j=1
∣∣tgij − tij∣∣+ CEg
Thirdly, considering that δg , ωg , CEg ∈ [0, 1], the above
expression means that CE
g > CEg . Furthermore, the larger
the value of δg , the larger the value of CE
g
. Hence, the
following result has been proved:
Proposition 2. Assuming that there is only one inconsistent
expert eg , who changes his/her assessment for element (xi, cj)
from tgij to rt
g
ij = (1− δg) · tgij + δg · tij , then the new expert
consensus index
CE
g
= δg (1− ωg) 1
rs
r∑
i=1
s∑
j=1
∣∣tgij − tij∣∣+ CEg (16)
is greater than his/her original consensus degree and mono-
tonically increases with feedback parameter δg ∈ (0, 1].
The case of one inconsistent expert changing his/her assess-
ments on more than one element can be considered as a series
of sequential steps of one assessment change. In each step
of this sequence the new consensus of the inconsistent expert
will be greater than that in the previous step, with the increase
in consensus being proportional to the feedback parameter
δg ∈ (0, 1] used in the feedback process. Equally, the case
with more than one inconsistent experts can be considered
as a series of sequential steps of one inconsistent expert
changing assessments. Based on this, the group of experts
may be willing to manipulate the consensus process by forcing
the inconsistent experts to adopt recommendation advices by
using a high feedback parameter value. This type of ‘group
manipulation’ is hindered with the below cost analysis and the
subsequent proposed optional feedback adjustment cost model.
C. Cost analysis of group manipulation
Let us assume that #EXPCH = l(≤ k). Following the
implementation of the feedback recommendation advices, their
new decision matrices will be
{
RΘp
(
rtpij
) |p = 1, ..., l} :
rtpij =
{
(1− δp) · tpij + δp · tij if (p, i, j) ∈ APS;
tpij otherwise.
The rest of experts’ decision matrices are unchanged{
RΘu = Θu =
(
tuij
)
, u = l + 1, ..., k
}
Experts in this later group have no adjustment cost, while in-
consistent experts’ adjustments cost after the feedback process
do as per the following:
Definition 11. The adjustment cost of inconsistent expert ep
after implementing the feedback advice is:
f (Θp, RΘp) = ωp |RΘp −Θp| , p = 1, ..., l (17)
The total cost of adjustment after the consensus feedback
process is
TC =
∑
p∈EXPCH
ωp |RΘp −Θp| =
∑
(p,i,j)∈APS
ωp |RΘp −Θp|
(18)
where |RΘp −Θp| = ∑
(p,i,j)∈APS
∣∣rtpij − tpij∣∣.
The total cost of adjustment is the result of the combination
of the individual adjustment costs and aggregation function.
A reasonable policy in the described consensus process is to
reach a balance between consensus (group aim) and adjust-
ment cost (individual aim).
The total cost of adjustment can be rewritten as follow:
TC =
∑
p∈EXPCH
ωp |RΘp −Θp|
=
∑
(p,i,j)∈APS
ωp
∣∣tpij − ((1− δp) tpij + δptij)∣∣
=
∑
(p,i,j)∈APS
δp · ωp
∣∣tpij − tij∣∣
(19)
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Hence, the following result is obtained:
Proposition 3. The total cost of adjustment monotonically
increases with respect to the feedback parameter δp ∈ (0, 1].
The higher the parameter value δp set by the group, the
higher the total cost of adjustment the inconsistent experts will
afford. In practice case, the inconsistent experts are aiming to
minimize their cost of adjustment while contributing to their
consensus reaching the threshold of group consensus [33],
[50]–[52]. This in turn implies that the total cost of adjustment
of inconsistent experts should be minimised while threshold
of group consensus is reached. This is the focus of the next
section.
D. Optimal feedback model to prevent group manipulation
Group manipulation will be hindered by determine the ηmin
value associated to the minimum adjustment cost of the below
optimization model:
Min
l∑
p=1
ωp |RΘp −Θp|
s.t.

1
rs
∣∣RΘp −RΘ∣∣ = 1− γ, p = 1, . . . , l;
1
rs
∣∣RΘu −RΘ∣∣ = 1− γ, u = l + 1, ..., k;
RΘ = DTOWAQ
(
RΘ1, ..., RΘk
)
;
ωh = (h/k)
η − ((h− 1) /k)η ;
0 ≤ γ ≤ 1; 0 < η < 1.
(20)
The objective function of Model (20) is to minimize the
total cost of adjustment subject to the each expert’ consensus
degree on their decision matrices reaching the group consensus
threshold. Using expression (19), the proposed optimization
model can be rewritten as follow:
Min
∑
(p,i,j)∈APS
δp · ωp
∣∣tpij − tij∣∣
s.t.

1
rs
∣∣RΘp −RΘ∣∣ = 1− γ, p = 1, . . . , l;
1
rs
∣∣RΘu −RΘ∣∣ = 1− γ, u = l + 1, ..., k;
RΘ = DTOWAQ
(
RΘ1, ..., RΘk
)
;
ωh = (h/k)
η − ((h− 1) /k)η ;
0 ≤ γ ≤ 1; 0 < η < 1.
(21)
Model (21) solution will determine the boundary feed-
back parameter value δmin to reach the threshold of group
consensus γ with minimum total cost of adjustment for the
inconsistent experts.
The adoption of the feedback mechanism advices by incon-
sistent experts will affect the group collective decision matrix.
The similarity of the group collective decision matrices before
(Θ) and after (RΘ) the implementation of the feedback process
is computed by applying expression (14):
sim
(
Θ, RΘ
)
= 1− 1
rs
∣∣Θ−RΘ∣∣ (22)
For experts who do not change assessments in the feedback
process (the consistent ones), u /∈ EXPCH , their consensus
degree on their DLT decision matrices before the feedback
process were equal or greater than the threshold of group
consensus, i.e. CEu = 1 − 1rs
∣∣Θu −Θ∣∣ > γ. After the
feedback process, solving model (21), it will also be the case
that these experts will shave a consensus degree on their
DLT decision matrices after the feedback process equal or
greater than the threshold of group consensus, i.e. RCEu =
1− 1rs
∣∣RΘu −RΘ∣∣ > γ. It is then clear that∣∣CEu −RCEu∣∣ ≤ 1− γ.
Thus the closer the threshold of group consensus is to 1, the
closer will be CEu and RCEu and consequently the more
similar will be Θ, and RΘ.
E. Consensus Reaching Algorithm with manipulation be-
haviour prevention
Algorithm 1 provides a formal description of the proposed
optimal feedback process model to prevent manipulation be-
haviour in a SN consensus reaching process.
VI. NUMERICAL EXAMPLE
Travel social App provides information on attractions, trans-
portation and prices to tourists. In addition, users can find
friends or acquaintances with similar travel plans or interests.
The App may recommend users to travel with others users with
matching travel plans regarding places and dates of travelling.
Four users {e1, e2, e3, e4} from the same association planning
a group travel consider three alternative destinations: ‘Bali
Island’ (x1); ‘Maldives Island’ (x2); and ‘Phuket Island’ (x3).
These are to be assessed using ‘attractions’ (c1); ‘price’ (c2);
‘location’ (c3); and ‘food’ (c4) as criteria with weighting
vector ω = (0.30, 0.20, 0.15, 0.35)T .
• Step 1. The users’ DLTFs decision matrices
based on the linguistic terms set Ω =
{Ω1 = low; Ω2 = middle; Ω3 = high} are:
Θ1 =

C1 C2 C3 C4
A1
(Ω1, 0.6)
(Ω2, 0.3)
(Ω3, 0.1)
(Ω1, 0.6)
(Ω2, 0.0)
(Ω3, 0.4)
(Ω1, 0.2)
(Ω2, 0.5)
(Ω3, 0.3)
(Ω1, 0.0)
(Ω2, 0.4)
(Ω3, 0.6)
A2
(Ω1, 0.1)
(Ω2, 0.2)
(Ω3, 0.7)
(Ω1, 0.0)
(Ω2, 0.4)
(Ω3, 0.6)
(Ω1, 0.2)
(Ω2, 0.3)
(Ω3, 0.5)
(Ω1, 0.1)
(Ω2, 0.5)
(Ω3, 0.4)
A3
(Ω1, 0.0)
(Ω2, 0.3)
(Ω3, 0.7)
(Ω1, 0.2)
(Ω2, 0.7)
(Ω3, 0.1)
(Ω1, 0.0)
(Ω2, 0.5)
(Ω3, 0.5)
(Ω1, 0.4)
(Ω2, 0.5)
(Ω3, 0.1)

Θ2 =

C1 C2 C3 C4
A1
(Ω1, 0.2)
(Ω2, 0.4)
(Ω3, 0.4)
(Ω1, 0.0)
(Ω2, 0.7)
(Ω3, 0.3)
(Ω1, 0.5)
(Ω2, 0.0)
(Ω3, 0.5)
(Ω1, 0.1)
(Ω2, 0.5)
(Ω3, 0.4)
A2
(Ω1, 0.0)
(Ω2, 0.6)
(Ω3, 0.4)
(Ω1, 0.2)
(Ω2, 0.0)
(Ω3, 0.8)
(Ω1, 0.3)
(Ω2, 0.2)
(Ω3, 0.5)
(Ω1, 0.2)
(Ω2, 0.2)
(Ω3, 0.6)
A3
(Ω1, 0.2)
(Ω2, 0.2)
(Ω3, 0.6)
(Ω1, 0.5)
(Ω2, 0.3)
(Ω3, 0.2)
(Ω1, 0.2)
(Ω2, 0.4)
(Ω3, 0.4)
(Ω1, 0.4)
(Ω2, 0.0)
(Ω3, 0.6)

Θ3 =

C1 C2 C3 C4
A1
(Ω1, 0.0)
(Ω2, 0.8)
(Ω3, 0.2)
(Ω1, 0.3)
(Ω2, 0.4)
(Ω3, 0.3)
(Ω1, 0.2)
(Ω2, 0.0)
(Ω3, 0.8)
(Ω1, 0.3)
(Ω2, 0.7)
(Ω3, 0.0)
A2
(Ω1, 0.1)
(Ω2, 0.1)
(Ω3, 0.8)
(Ω1, 0.2)
(Ω2, 0.4)
(Ω3, 0.4)
(Ω1, 0.3)
(Ω2, 0.7)
(Ω3, 0.0)
(Ω1, 0.0)
(Ω2, 0.5)
(Ω3, 0.5)
A3
(Ω1, 0.2)
(Ω2, 0.8)
(Ω3, 0.0)
(Ω1, 0.3)
(Ω2, 0.6)
(Ω3, 0.1)
(Ω1, 0.1)
(Ω2, 0.9)
(Ω3, 0.0)
(Ω1, 0.0)
(Ω2, 0.6)
(Ω3, 0.4)

Θ4 =

C1 C2 C3 C4
A1
(Ω1, 0.1)
(Ω2, 0.0)
(Ω3, 0.9)
(Ω1, 0.3)
(Ω2, 0.6)
(Ω3, 0.1)
(Ω1, 0.0)
(Ω2, 0.8)
(Ω3, 0.2)
(Ω1, 0.7)
(Ω2, 0.3)
(Ω3, 0.0)
A2
(Ω1, 0.2)
(Ω2, 0.3)
(Ω3, 0.5)
(Ω1, 0.3)
(Ω2, 0.6)
(Ω3, 0.1)
(Ω1, 0.2)
(Ω2, 0.0)
(Ω3, 0.8)
(Ω1, 0.1)
(Ω2, 0.2)
(Ω3, 0.7)
A3
(Ω1, 0.4)
(Ω2, 0.6)
(Ω3, 0.0)
(Ω1, 0.2)
(Ω2, 0.4)
(Ω3, 0.4)
(Ω1, 0.6)
(Ω2, 0.0)
(Ω3, 0.4)
(Ω1, 0.0)
(Ω2, 0.5)
(Ω3, 0.5)

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Algorithm 1: Consensus Reaching Optimization
Model with Manipulation Behaviour Prevention
begin
Input: Experts’ opinions
{
Θh =
(
thij
)
r×s
}
;
(h = 1, ..., k);
Criteria Weighting Vector: ω = (ωc1 , ..., ωcs);
Sociomatrix SL;
Output: Ranking of alternatives;
1 Apply Eqs. (4) and (5) to SL to derive expert’s
TDC indexes;
2 Apply Eqs. (5)–(6) to TDC indexes to derive
experts’ weights and compute group collective
DLTFs decision matrix as per Definition (6) with
a particular η value;
3 Apply Eqs. (12)-(14) to compute consensus
degrees;
4 Individual Manipulation Behaviour Prevention
begin
4a. Inconsistent experts and their set of
inconsistent assessments (APS) are identified;
4b. To prevent individual manipulation,
compute the attitude parameter ηmin that
results in minimum total cost with a δ value
that takes inconsistent experts’ consensus
degree above the group consensus threshold
(or use default traditional feedback processes
δ = 0.5);
end
5 Group Manipulation Behaviour Prevention
begin
5a. To prevent group manipulation, obtain
optimal boundary feedback parameter δmin by
solving minimum cost optimization model
(21) with ηmin;
5b. Present experts with feedback mechanism
advices, generated with solution to model
(21), and with visual representation of group
consensus threshold being reached after
implementation of feedback recommendations;
end
6 Rank alternatives;
end
• Step 2. The users’ trust relationship network of Fig. 2
has the following DLTS:
SL =

−
Ω1, 0.8Ω2, 0.2Ω3, 0.0

Ω1, 0.0Ω2, 0.4Ω3, 0.6

Ω1, 0.2Ω2, 0.7Ω3, 0.1
Ω1, 0.6Ω2, 0.3Ω3, 0.1
 −
Ω1, 0.2Ω2, 0.0Ω3, 0.8
 −Ω1, 0.4Ω2, 0.3Ω3, 0.3

Ω1, 0.0Ω2, 0.7Ω3, 0.3
 −
Ω1, 0.2Ω2, 0.8Ω3, 0.0

−
Ω1, 0.1Ω2, 0.9Ω3, 0.0

Ω1, 0.2Ω2, 0.5Ω3, 0.3
 −

 Distributed Trust Network
E1E2
E3 E4
Fig. 2: Tourists social trust relationship network
The users’ TDC indexes are:
TDC (e1) = {(Ω1, 0.5) , (Ω2, 0.3) , (Ω3, 0.2)} ;
TDC (e2) = {(Ω1, 0.3) , (Ω2, 0.6) , (Ω3, 0.1)} ;
TDC (e3) = {(Ω1, 0.13) , (Ω2, 0.3) , (Ω3, 0.57)} ;
TDC (e4) = {(Ω1, 0.2) , (Ω2, 0.75) , (Ω3, 0.05)} .
According to (1), the following ordering is obtained :
TDC (e3) > TDC (e4) > TDC (e2) > TDC (e1) .
From (5)–(6), the tourists’ importance degree are:
ω1 = 1− (3/4)η ; ω2 = (3/4)η − (2/4)η ;
ω3 = (1/4)
η
; ω4 = (2/4)
η − (1/4)η .
With η = 6/8, we get
ωe1 = 0.19; ωe2 = 0.22; ωe3 = 0.35; ωe4 = 0.24.
and the group decision matrix Θ is:
Θ =

C1 C2 C3 C4
A1
(Ω1, 0.19)
(Ω2, 0.43)
(Ω3, 0.39)
(Ω1, 0.29)
(Ω2, 0.44)
(Ω3, 0.27)
(Ω1, 0.22)
(Ω2, 0.29)
(Ω3, 0.49)
(Ω1, 0.30)
(Ω2, 0.50)
(Ω3, 0.20)
A2
(Ω1, 0.10)
(Ω2, 0.28)
(Ω3, 0.62)
(Ω1, 0.19)
(Ω2, 0.36)
(Ω3, 0.45)
(Ω1, 0.26)
(Ω2, 0.35)
(Ω3, 0.39)
(Ω1, 0.09)
(Ω2, 0.36)
(Ω3, 0.55)
A3
(Ω1, 0.21)
(Ω2, 0.52)
(Ω3, 0.27)
(Ω1, 0.30)
(Ω2, 0.51)
(Ω3, 0.19)
(Ω1, 0.22)
(Ω2, 0.50)
(Ω3, 0.28)
(Ω1, 0.16)
(Ω2, 0.43)
(Ω3, 0.41)

• Step 3. Apply Eqs. (12)-(14) to compute consensus
degrees:
– Consensus degrees on the elements.(
CE1ij
)
=
0.72 0.71 0.86 0.730.95 0.87 0.93 0.90
0.71 0.87 0.85 0.79

(
CE2ij
)
=
0.98 0.81 0.81 0.870.79 0.76 0.90 0.89
0.77 0.86 0.92 0.71

(
CE3ij
)
=
0.75 0.97 0.79 0.870.88 0.97 0.74 0.91
0.82 0.94 0.73 0.89

(
CE4ij
)
=
0.66 0.88 0.66 0.730.72 0.77 0.73 0.89
0.83 0.86 0.76 0.89

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– Consensus degrees on the alternatives.(
CE1i
)
= (0.76, 0.91, 0.81);(
CE2i
)
= (0.87, 0.84, 0.82);(
CE3i
)
= (0.85, 0.87, 0.85);(
CE4i
)
= (0.74, 0.83, 0.81);
– Level 3. Consensus degree on the decision matrix.
CE1 = 0.82; CE2 = 0.84;
CE3 = 0.86; CE4 = 0.79.
Based on a threshold of group consensus of γ = 0.8,
the inconsistent expert (e4), corresponding APS assess-
ments, and visualizations as per Fig. 3 are presented to
experts:
APS = {(4, 1, 1) , (4, 1, 3) , (4, 1, 4)}.
In this example, e4 is identified as the only inconsis-
tent expert. Therefore, the feedback mechanism is acti-
vated.As aforementioned, each user has their own motiva-
tions to manipulate weights via the attitude parameter to
obtain their desired ranking of alternatives, which can be
overcome by determining the optimal attitude parameter.
• Step 4. To identify ‘individual manipulation’, Table II
and its graphical visualization in Fig. 4 with attitude
parameter ηi ranging from 1/8 to 7/8 are obtained with
δ = 0.5. The individual manipulation of ηi is prevented
by selecting the value with minimum adjustment cost. In
this case the minimum TC = 0.672 is achieved when
ηmin = 0.5. However, this value ηmin also results in
a new consensus degree for expert of CI4 = 0.81,
which is above the threshold of group consensus and
therefore there is room for e4 to reduce the adjustment
cost with the computation of δmin, solution to model (21),
to satisfy group consensus and maintain independence
simultaneously.
TABLE II: Consensus degrees with individual manipulation of
η and corresponding TC values using δ = 0.5
η experts weights CI4 TC
1/8 (0.03, 0.05, 0.84, 0.08)T 0.81 1.147
2/8 (0.07, 0.09, 0.71, 0.13)T 0.83 1.906
3/8 (0.10, 0.13, 0.59, 0.18)T 0.83 2.087
4/8 (0.13, 0.16, 0.50, 0.21)T 0.81 0.672
5/8 (0.16, 0.19, 0.42, 0.23)T 0.82 0.702
6/8 (0.19, 0.22, 0.35, 0.24)T 0.82 0.718
7/8 (0.22, 0.23, 0.30, 0.25)T 0.82 0.723
• Step 5. To avoid ‘group manipulation’, the minimum cost
optimization model (21) with optimal attitude parameter
ηmin = 0.5 becomes model (23):
Min
∑
(p,i,j)∈APS
δp · ωp
∣∣tpij − tpij∣∣
s.t.

1
12
∣∣RΘp −RΘ∣∣ = 0.2, p = 4
1
12
∣∣RΘu −RΘ∣∣ = 0.2, u = 1, 2, 3
RT = DTOWAQ
(
RΘ1, ..., RΘ4
)
ωh = (i/4)
ηmin − ((i− 1) /4)ηmin , ηmin = 0.5
(23)
The solution of this model results in δmin = 0.2 and
the total costs of the feedback process adjustment for
different values of η are compared with previous ones
with δ = 0.5 used in traditional feedback processes. This
is also illustrated in Fig. 5. Obviously, the minimum total
cost is achieved in both cases when ηmin = 0.5, although
the total cost is always lower for δmin = 0.20 no mater
which η value is implemented. The inconsistent expert
will modify his/her assessment less with (ηmin, δmin) =
(0.5, 0.2) than with any other duple (ηmin, δ) (Fig. 6a),
which helps to maintain individual independence and
minimize the total cost of adjustment, while at the same
time achieving the group aim of reaching consensus
(Fig. 6b).
TABLE III: Total cost analysis by preventing group manipu-
lation of δ
η 1/8 2/8 3/8 4/8 5/8 6/8 7/8
TCδmin=0.2 0.876 0.984 1.024 0.269 0.285 0.295 0.295
TCδ=0.5 1.147 0.906 2.087 0.672 0.702 0.718 0.723
• Step 6. Implementing the boundary feedback parameter,
the recommendations for user e4 are:
– Change your assessment for alternative x1 under cri-
terion C1 with
{(Ω1, 0.11) , (Ω2, 0.10) , (Ω3, 0.79)}.
– Change your assessment for alternative x1 under cri-
terion C3 with
{(Ω1, 0.04) , (Ω2, 0.69) , (Ω3, 0.27)}.
– Change your assessment for alternative x1 under cri-
terion C4 with
{(Ω1, 0.62) , (Ω2, 0.35) , (Ω3, 0.03)}.
Using the criteria weighting vector: ω =
(0.30, 0.20, 0.15, 0.35)T , the collective assessments
of the three alternatives are:
r1 = {(Ω1, 0.23) , (Ω2, 0.47) , (Ω3, 0.30)} ;
r2 = {(Ω1, 0.13) , (Ω2, 0.36) , (Ω3, 0.52)} ;
r3 = {(Ω1, 0.20) , (Ω2, 0.53) , (Ω3, 0.27)} .
Their corresponding expectation degrees are:
E(r1) = 2.06, E(r2) = 2.34, E(r3) = 2.07.
Hence, ‘Maldives Island’ becomes the travel destination
of consensus.
The example clearly illustrates that the proposed optimal
model allows the group to find the optimal feedback parameter
to reach the group consensus threshold with minimum adjust-
ment cost for the inconsistent experts. These two goals (group
consensus with minimum changes for individuals) are indeed
the goals of all members working together in a group decision
making to bring benefit to the whole group while maintaining
the independence of their members as much as possible. Thus,
the proposed methodology facilitates the acceptance of the
feedback process advices by individual members, which is key
for any group to reach consensus.
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Fig. 3: Visual representation of consensus indexes at three different levels before feedback process
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VII. COMPARISON AND DISCUSSION
This section summarises the main contribution of manipu-
lation behaviour in GDM reported in the literatures, which are
listed in Table IV, with the aim to highlight their differences
with the contribution of the proposed method.
Gong et al. [34] explored the consensus evolution path
based on the economic interpretation, but it did not men-
tion the psychological behavior of decision makers. Although
Cao et al. [5] developed a personalized consensus feedback
mechanism to stop the ‘group manipulation’, they ignored
the problem of ‘individual manipulation’. On the one hand,
Yager and Dong et al. [41]–[43] focused on the properties of
aggregation operators to investigate the problem of strategic
manipulation, which both methodologies aim to prevent ma-
nipulation behaviors by modifying the traditional paradigm.
In [41], Dong et al. applied their improved method to the
large-scale group decision making framework. On the other
0.125 0.25 0.375 0.5 0.625 0.75 0.875
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
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η
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Fig. 5: Total cost analysis by preventing group manipulation
of δ
hand, some novel consensus reaching process models were
proposed for managing non-cooperative behaviors to avoid
strategic manipulation behaviors [27], [53]–[55], with the
corresponding larger-scale decision making framework were
studied in [27], [54], [55]. Fuzzy clustering approach was
used in large-scale group decision making by Palomares et
al.[55], while Palomares et al. and Labella et al. [56], [57]
had pioneered a framework system of consensus analysis by
integrating different consensus reaching process models, which
they called AFRYCA. We conclude that none of the reported
manipulation behaviour models in GDM deal with the individ-
ual and group behaviour manipulations at the same time, which
is per a novel and useful contribution in developing consensus
reaching processes in practice, as it was emphasized above
that the solution model proposed will facilitate the acceptance
and posterior willing implementation of the feedback process
advices by individual members.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
This paper investigates an optimal feedback model to
simultaneously prevent the individual and group behaviour
manipulations in consensus in a social network group decision
making framework. Compared with other consensus models
proposed in the literature, the main novelties of the proposed
model are:
(i) It studies the individual manipulation in the feedback
process recommendation mechanism. The weights as-
signment mechanism can be manipulated by individual
experts to get a greater influence. However, reaching
consensus with this kind of individual manipulation may
increase the total adjustment cost for the group. To pre-
vent individual manipulation, a policy based on minimiz-
ing the group adjustment cost is proposed to derive the
(optimal) weights for each expert. This is achieved with
the implementation of a behavioural weights assignment
method, which conveniently describes the different atti-
tude stages from ‘dictatorship’ to ‘democracy’, together
with a sensitivity analysis of the adjustment cost to
determine the optimal attitude parameter leading to the
minimum group adjustment cost.
(ii) It explores the group manipulation in the process leading
to the recommendations to feedback to inconsistent ex-
perts. To arrive at group consensus quickly, traditional
consensus reaching processes are built under the as-
sumption that inconsistent experts are ‘forced’ by the
group to implement the recommendation advices with a
fixed feedback parameter. This approach implies, more
frequent than not, that the inconsistent experts will have
to afford a higher adjustment cost than necessary as this
leads to the consensus degree of inconsistent experts
to jump from below to above the group consensus
threshold, when reaching this threshold is sufficient. In
other word, this type of group manipulation reduces the
inconsistent experts’ independence. To hinder this group
manipulation behaviour in consensus reaching process,
an optimization feedback model is proposed to obtain the
optimal feedback parameter for the inconsistent experts
consensus degrees reach the group consensus threshold
while their cost of adjustment of changing original
assessments is minimized. Therefore, the inconsistent
experts can find a realistic and admissible equilibrium
point between consensus (group aim) and independence
(individual aim).
Behavioural manipulation plays an important role in group
consensus. This behavioural manipulation utilizes trust rela-
tionship as a resource to assign weights to experts. There
may be no direct trust relationship between some experts in
social network [58], in which trust propagation methodologies
could be considered in future as tools to build indirect trust
relationship by the trusted third party in order to tackle
behavioural manipulations. Additionally, the proposed method
will be further developed to be applied in the large-scale group
decision making framework.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This work was supported by National Natural Science
Foundation of China (NSFC) (No.71971135,71571166) and
FEDER funds provided in the National Spanish project
TIN2016-75850-R.
REFERENCES
[1] E. Herrera-Viedma, F. J. Cabrerizo, J. Kacprzyk, and W. Pedrycz, “A
review of soft consensus models in a fuzzy environment,” Information
Fusion, vol. 17, pp. 4–13, 2014.
[2] X. L. Tian, Z. S. Xu, and H. Fujita, “Sequential funding the venture
project or not? A prospect consensus process with probabilistic hesitant
fuzzy preference information,” Knowledge-Based Systems, vol. 161, pp.
172–184, 2018.
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON FUZZY SYSTEMS:, VOL. XX, NO. Y, MONTH 2020 12
TABLE IV: Comparisons of the proposed consensus method and the existing methods
References Kind(s) Main Contribution(s)
Cao et al. [5] small-scale group deci-
sion making
“A framework of personalized feedback mechanism to select different
feedback parameters according to individual consensus degree.”
Gong et al.[34] small-scale group deci-
sion making
“It explores individual interval preferences in consensus decision mak-
ing based on minimum cost and maximum return.”
Yager [42] small-scale group deci-
sion making
“It suggests to modify procedures to reduce the ability of individual
agents to strategic manipulate the preference function.”
Yager[43] small-scale group deci-
sion making
”It discusses the strategic manipulation of the preference information
and proposes a mechanism to defend against this type of strategic
manipulation.”
Dong et al. [41] large-scale group deci-
sion making
“It reveales the process of designing a strategic attribute weight vector
and analyzes the conditions to manipulate a strategic attribute weight.”
Dong et al. [53] small-scale group deci-
sion making
“It presents a self-management mechanism to generate experts’ weights
dynamically and then it integrates it into the consensus reaching process
to allow the management of non-cooperative behaviors.”
Xu et al.[54] large-group emergency
decision making
“An improved consensus model is proposed to manage minority opin-
ions and non-cooperative behaviors for large-group emergency decision
making.”
Palomares et al. [55] large-scale group deci-
sion making
“It presents a consensus model to detect and manage individual and
subgroup non-cooperative behaviors .”
Palomares et al. [56] large-scale group deci-
sion making
“It presents a self-developed consensus analysis system) to facilitate a
study of the performance of each consensus model.”
[3] R. X. Nie and J. Q. Wang, “Prospect theory-based consistency recovery
strategies with multiplicative probabilistic linguistic preference relations
in managing group decision making,” Arabian Journal for Science and
Engineering, vol. 45, pp. 2113–2130, 2020.
[4] Z. B. Wu and J. P. Xu, “Managing consistency and consensus in group
decision making with hesitant fuzzy linguistic preference relations,”
Omega, vol. 65, pp. 28–40, 2016.
[5] M. S. Cao, J. Wu, F. Chiclana, R. Uren˜a, and E. Herrera-Viedma,
“A personalized consensus feedback mechanism based on maximum
harmony degree,” IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics:
Systems, 2020, DOI:10.1109/TSMC.2019.2960052.
[6] H. J. Zhang, Y. C. Dong, F. Chiclana, and S. Yu, “Consensus efficiency
in group decision making: A comprehensive comparative study and its
optimal design,” European Journal of Operational Research, vol. 275,
no. 2, pp. 580–598, 2019.
[7] Z. B. Wu, S. Huang, and J. P. Xu, “Multi-stage optimization models for
individual consistency and group consensus with preference relations,”
European Journal of Operational Research, vol. 275, no. 1, pp. 182–194,
2019.
[8] H. H. Zhang, G. Kou, and Y. Peng, “Soft consensus cost models for
group decision making and economic interpretations,” European Journal
of Operational Research, vol. 277, no. 3, pp. 964–980, 2019.
[9] J. Wu, F. Chiclana, H. Fujita, and E. Herrera-Viedma, “A visual
interaction consensus model for social network group decision making
with trust propagation,” Knowledge-Based Systems, vol. 122, pp. 39–50,
2017.
[10] J. Casco´n, T. Gonza´lez-Arteaga, and R. de Andre´s Calle, “Reaching
social consensus family budgets: The Spanish case,” Omega, vol. 86,
pp. 28–41, 2019.
[11] S. P. Wan and D. F. Li, “Fuzzy LINMAP approach to heterogeneous
MADM considering comparisons of alternatives with hesitation de-
grees,” Omega, vol. 41, no. 6, pp. 925–940, 2013.
[12] Y. Liu, Z. P. Fan, T. H. You, and W. Y. Zhang, “Large group decision-
making (LGDM) with the participators from multiple subgroups of
stakeholders: A method considering both the collective evaluation and
the fairness of the alternative,” Computers & Industrial Engineering,
vol. 122, pp. 262–272, 2018.
[13] J. F. Pang and J. Y. Liang, “Evaluation of the results of multi-attribute
group decision-making with linguistic information,” Omega, vol. 40,
no. 3, pp. 294–301, 2012.
[14] C. T. Bergstrom and J. B. Bak-Coleman, “Information gerrymandering
in social networks skews collective decision-making,” NATURE, vol.
573, pp. 40–41, 2019.
[15] X. Y. Zhang, H. Y. Zhang, and J. Q. Wang, “Discussing incomplete
2-tuple fuzzy linguistic preference relations in multi-granular linguistic
MCGDM with unknown weight information,” Soft Computing, vol. 23,
no. 6, pp. 2015–2032, 2019.
[16] Y. C. Dong, Z. G. Ding, L. Martı´nez, and F. Herrera, “Managing con-
sensus based on leadership in opinion dynamics,” Information Sciences,
vol. 397, pp. 187–205, 2017.
[17] Y. C. Dong, Q. B. Zha, H. J. Zhang, G. Kou, H. Fujita, F. Chiclana,
and E. Herrera-Viedma, “Consensus reaching in social network group
decision making: Research paradigms and challenges,” Knowledge-
Based Systems, vol. 162, pp. 3–13, 2018.
[18] N. Capuano, F. Chiclana, E. Herrera-Viedma, H. Fujita, and V. Loia,
“Fuzzy group decision making for influence-aware recommendations,”
Computers in Human Behavior, vol. 101, pp. 371–379, 2019.
[19] N. Capuano, F. Chiclana, H. Fujita, E. Herrera-Viedma, and V. Loia,
“Fuzzy group decision making with incomplete information guided by
social influence,” IEEE Transactions on Fuzzy Systems, vol. 26, no. 3,
pp. 1704–1718, 2017.
[20] J. Wu, F. Chiclana, and E. Herrera-Viedma, “Trust based consensus
model for social network in an incomplete linguistic information con-
text,” Applied Soft Computing, vol. 35, pp. 827–839, 2015.
[21] X. Liu, Y. J. Xu, R. Montes, and F. Herrera, “Social network group
decision making: Managing self-confidence-based consensus model with
the dynamic importance degree of experts and trust-based feedback
mechanism,” Information Sciences, vol. 505, pp. 215–232, 2019.
[22] Z. P. Tian, R. X. Nie, and J. Q. Wang, “Social network analysis-
based consensus-supporting framework for large-scale group decision-
making with incomplete interval type-2 fuzzy information,” Information
Sciences, vol. 502, pp. 446–471, 2019.
[23] R. Uren˜a, G. Kou, Y. C. Dong, F. Chiclana, and E. Herrera-Viedma, “A
review on trust propagation and opinion dynamics in social networks and
group decision making frameworks,” Information Sciences, vol. 478, pp.
461–475, 2019.
[24] T. Wu, X. W. Liu, J. D. Qin, and F. Herrera, “Consensus evolution
networks: A consensus reaching tool for managing consensus thresholds
in group decision making,” Information Fusion, vol. 52, pp. 375–388,
2019.
[25] B. S. Liu, Q. Zhou, R. X. Ding, I. Palomares, and F. Herrera, “Large-
scale group decision making model based on social network analysis:
Trust relationship-based conflict detection and elimination,” European
Journal of Operational Research, vol. 275, no. 2, pp. 737–754, 2019.
[26] J. Wu, X. Li, F. Chiclana, and R. R. Yager, “An attitudinal trust
recommendation mechanism to balance consensus and harmony in group
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON FUZZY SYSTEMS:, VOL. XX, NO. Y, MONTH 2020 13
decision making,” IEEE Transactions on Fuzzy Systems, vol. 27, no. 11,
pp. 2163–2175, 2019.
[27] Y. C. Dong, S. H. Zhao, H. J. Zhang, F. Chiclana, and E. Herrera-
Viedma, “A self-management mechanism for noncooperative behaviors
in large-scale group consensus reaching processes,” IEEE Transactions
on Fuzzy Systems, vol. 26, no. 6, pp. 3276–3288, 2018.
[28] H. B. Yan, T. J. Ma, and V. N. Huynh, “On qualitative multi-attribute
group decision making and its consensus measure: A probability based
perspective,” Omega, vol. 70, pp. 94–117, 2017.
[29] X. Liu, Y. J. Xu, and F. Herrera, “Consensus model for large-scale group
decision making based on fuzzy preference relation with self-confidence:
Detecting and managing overconfidence behaviors,” Information Fusion,
vol. 52, pp. 245–256, 2019.
[30] J. Wu, Q. Sun, H. Fujita, and F. Chiclana, “An attitudinal consensus
degree to control the feedback mechanism in group decision making
with different adjustment cost,” Knowledge-Based Systems, vol. 164,
pp. 265–273, 2019.
[31] Z. W. Gong, N. Zhang, K. W. Li, L. Martı´nez, and W. Zhao, “Consensus
decision models for preferential voting with abstentions,” Computers &
Industrial Engineering, vol. 115, pp. 670–682, 2018.
[32] Z. Z. Ma, J. J. Zhu, K. Ponnambalam, and S. T. Zhang, “A clustering
method for large-scale group decision-making with multi-stage hesitant
fuzzy linguistic terms,” Information Fusion, vol. 50, pp. 231–250, 2019.
[33] T. Wu, K. Zhang, X. W. Liu, and C. Y. Cao, “A two-stage social
trust network partition model for large-scale group decision-making
problems,” Knowledge-Based Systems, vol. 163, pp. 632–643, 2019.
[34] Z. W. Gong, X. X. Xu, H. H. Zhang, U. A. Ozturk, E. Herrera-Viedma,
and C. Xu, “The consensus models with interval preference opinions
and their economic interpretation,” Omega, vol. 55, pp. 81–90, 2015.
[35] A´. Labella, H. B. Liu, R. M. Rodrı´guez, and L. Martı´nez, “A cost consen-
sus metric for consensus reaching processes based on a comprehensive
minimum cost model,” European Journal of Operational Research, vol.
281, no. 2, pp. 316–331, 2020.
[36] X. Tan, Z. W. Gong, F. Chiclana, and N. Zhang, “Consensus modeling
with cost chance constraint under uncertainty opinions,” Applied Soft
Computing, vol. 67, pp. 721–727, 2018.
[37] J. Wu, Y. J. Liu, and C. Y. Liang, “A consensus-and harmony-based
feedback mechanism for multiple attribute group decision making with
correlated intuitionistic fuzzy sets,” International Transactions in Oper-
ational Research, vol. 22, no. 6, pp. 1033–1054, 2015.
[38] S. Wasserman, K. Faust et al., Social network analysis: Methods and
applications. Cambridge university press, 1994, vol. 8.
[39] B. Z. Sun and W. M. Ma, “An approach to consensus measurement of
linguistic preference relations in multi-attribute group decision making
and application,” Omega, vol. 51, pp. 83–92, 2015.
[40] J. Wu, L. F. Dai, F. Chiclana, H. Fujita, and E. Herrera-Viedma,
“A minimum adjustment cost feedback mechanism based consensus
model for group decision making under social network with distributed
linguistic trust,” Information Fusion, vol. 41, pp. 232–242, 2018.
[41] Y. C. Dong, Y. T. Liu, H. M. Liang, F. Chiclana, and E. Herrera-Viedma,
“Strategic weight manipulation in multiple attribute decision making,”
Omega, vol. 75, pp. 154–164, 2018.
[42] R. R. Yager, “Penalizing strategic preference manipulation in multi-agent
decision making,” IEEE Transactions on Fuzzy Systems, vol. 9, no. 3,
pp. 393–403, 2001.
[43] R. R. Yager, “Defending against strategic manipulation in uninorm-
based multi-agent decision making,” European Journal of Operational
Research, vol. 141, no. 1, pp. 217–232, 2002.
[44] R. R. Yager, “On ordered weighted averaging aggregation operators in
multicriteria decision making,” IEEE Transactions on systems, Man, and
Cybernetics, vol. 18, no. 1, pp. 183–190, 1988.
[45] R. R. Yager, “Quantifier guided aggregation using OWA operators,”
International Journal of Intelligent Systems, vol. 11, no. 1, pp. 49–73,
1996.
[46] R. R. Yager and D. P. Filev, “Induced ordered weighted averaging
operators,” IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, Part
B (Cybernetics), vol. 29, no. 2, pp. 141–150, 1999.
[47] F. Chiclana, E. Herrera-Viedma, F. Herrera, and S. Alonso, “Some
induced ordered weighted averaging operators and their use for solving
group decision-making problems based on fuzzy preference relations,”
European Journal of Operational Research, vol. 182, no. 1, pp. 383–399,
2007.
[48] P. Pe´rez-Asurmendi and F. Chiclana, “Linguistic majorities with differ-
ence in support,” Applied Soft Computing, vol. 18, pp. 196 – 208, 2014.
[49] “Qualified majority – consilium,” https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/council-
eu/voting-system/qualified-majority/, accessed: 2020-03-01.
[50] Y. C. Dong, Y. F. Xu, H. Y. Li, and B. Feng, “The OWA-based consensus
operator under linguistic representation models using position indexes,”
European Journal of Operational Research, vol. 203, no. 2, pp. 455–463,
2010.
[51] P. Wu, J. M. Zhu, L. G. Zhou, and H. Y. Chen, “Local feedback mech-
anism based on consistency-derived for consensus building in group
decision making with hesitant fuzzy linguistic preference relations,”
Computers & Industrial Engineering, vol. 137, p. 106001, 2019.
[52] S. P. Wan, F. Wang, and J. Y. Dong, “A group decision-making method
considering both the group consensus and multiplicative consistency
of interval-valued intuitionistic fuzzy preference relations,” Information
Sciences, vol. 466, pp. 109–128, 2018.
[53] Y. C. Dong, H. J. Zhang, and E. Herrera-Viedma, “Integrating experts’
weights generated dynamically into the consensus reaching process
and its applications in managing non-cooperative behaviors,” Decision
Support Systems, vol. 84, pp. 1–15, 2016.
[54] X. H. Xu, Z. J. Du, and X. H. Chen, “Consensus model for multi-criteria
large-group emergency decision making considering non-cooperative
behaviors and minority opinions,” Decision Support Systems, vol. 79,
pp. 150–160, 2015.
[55] I. Palomares, L. Martinez, and F. Herrera, “A consensus model to detect
and manage noncooperative behaviors in large-scale group decision
making,” IEEE Transactions on Fuzzy Systems, vol. 22, no. 3, pp. 516–
530, 2013.
[56] I. Palomares, F. J. Estrella, L. Martı´nez, and F. Herrera, “Consensus
under a fuzzy context: Taxonomy, analysis framework AFRYCA and
experimental case of study,” Information Fusion, vol. 20, pp. 252–271,
2014.
[57] A´. Labella and L. Martı´nez, “AFRYCA 3.0: An improved framework
for consensus analysis in group decision making,” in International
Conference on Intelligent Decision Technologies. Springer, 2018, pp.
76–86.
[58] J. Wu, J. L. Chang, Q. W. Cao, and C. Y. Liang, “A trust propagation and
collaborative filtering based method for incomplete information in social
network group decision making with type-2 linguistic trust,” Computers
& Industrial Engineering, vol. 127, pp. 853–864, 2019.
Jian Wu (SM’16) received the B.Sc. and Ph.D.
degrees in Management Science and Engineering
from Hefei University of Technology, Hefei, China,
in 2000 and 2008, respectively. He is a Distinguished
Professor with the School of Economics and Man-
agement, Shanghai Maritime University, Shanghai,
China. From October 2012 to October 2013, he was
an Academic Research Visitor with the Centre for
Computational Intelligence, De Montfort University,
Leicester, U.K. He has 60+ papers published in
leading journals such IEEE Transactions on Fuzzy
Systems, IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics:Systems,
Information Fusion, Information Sciences, Knowledge-Based Systems, Expert
Systems with Applications, Applied Soft Computing. Thirteen papers have
been classed as Highly Cited Papers by the Essential Science Indicators,
four of them are HOT paper. One of his research papers was awarded the
prestigious Emerald Citations of Excellence for 2017. His research interests
include group decision making, social network, fuzzy preference modeling,
and information fusion.
Prof. Wu is an Area Editor of the Journal of Computers & Industrial
Engineering, Associate Editor of the Journal of Intelligent and Fuzzy Systems
and a Guest Editor of Applied Soft Computing.
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON FUZZY SYSTEMS:, VOL. XX, NO. Y, MONTH 2020 14
Mingshuo Cao received the BSc in Accounting
from Shanghai Maritime University, China, in 2018.
He is currently enrolled in a Ph.D. degree at Shang-
hai Maritime University. His research interest is
mainly in group decision making.
Francisco Chiclana received the BSc and PhD in
Mathematics from the University of Granada, Spain,
in 1989 and 2000, respectively.
He is a Professor of Computational Intelligence
and Decision Making with the School of Computer
Science and Informatics, Faculty of Computing,
Engineering and Media, De Montfort University,
Leicester, U.K. He is an Associate Editor and a
Guest Editor for several ISI indexed journals. He has
organized and chaired special sessions/workshops in
many major international conferences in research
areas as fuzzy preference modeling, decision support systems, consensus,
recommender systems, social networks, rationality/consistency, aggregation.
He is currently a Highly Cited Researcher in Computer Sciences (according
to Essential Science Indicators by Clarivate Analytics).
Yucheng Dong received the B.S. and M.S. de-
grees in mathematics from Chongqing University,
Chongqing, China, in 2002 and 2004, respectively,
and the Ph.D. degree in management from Xian
Jiaotong University, Xian, China, in 2008.
He is currently a Professor with the Business
School, Sichuan University, Chengdu, China. He has
authored or coauthored more than 100 international
journal papers in Decision Support Systems, the
European Journal of Operational Research, the IEEE
Transactions on Big Data, the IEEE Transactions on
Cybernetics, the IEEE Transactions on Fuzzy Systems, the IEEE Transactions
on System, Man, and Cybernetics, and Omega. His current research interests
include consensus process, computing with words, opinion dynamics, and
social network decision-making.
Dr. Dong is an Editorial Board Member of Information Fusion, an Area
Editor of Computers & Industrial Engineering, and an Associate Editor of
Group Decision and Negotiation and the IEEE Transactions on System, Man,
and Cybernetics: Systems.
Enrique Herrera-Viedma received the M.Sc. and
Ph.D degrees in computer science from the Univer-
sity of Granada, Granada, Spain, in 1993 and 1996,
respectively.
He is a Professor of computer science and the
Vice-President for Research and Knowledge Trans-
fer with University of Granada,Granada, Spain. His
h-index is 68 with more than 17 000 citations
received in Web of Science and 85 in Google Scholar
with more than 29000 cites received. He has been
identified as one of the worlds most influential
researchers by the Shanghai Center and Thomson Reuters/Clarivate Analytics
in both computer science and engineering in the years 2014,2015,2016,2017
and 2018. His current research interests include group decision making, con-
sensus models, linguistic modeling, aggregation of information, information
retrieval,bibliometric, digital libraries, web quality evaluation, recommender
systems, and social media. Dr. Herrera-Viedma is currently Vice-President
for Publications in IEEE SMC Society and an Associate Editor in several
journals such as IEEE Transactions on Fuzzy Systems, IEEE Transactions on
Systems, Man and Cybernetics: Systems, Information Sciences, Applied Soft
Computing, Soft Computing, Fuzzy Optimization and Decision Making, and
Knowledge-Based Systems.
